The Arab War Chapter Four

episode in the Mesopotamian campaign no less picturesque to the onlookers than it was significant to those who have studied the course of Arabian politics. For the past century the history of the interior of the peninsula has centred round the rivalry between the Emirs of Northern and Southern Nejd, Ibn Rashid and Ibn Saud. When Abdul Aziz, the present representative of the house of Saud, was a boy of fifteen, the power of the Rashid touched its zenith; the great Emir Mohammed, Doughty’s grudging host, drove the Saud into exile and occupied their capital, Riyadh. For eleven years Abdul Aziz ate the bread of adversity, but in 1902, the Sheikh of Kuweit, on the Persian Gulf, himself at enmity with the Rashid, saw in the young emir a promising weapon and gave him his chance. With a force of some eighty camel riders supplied by Kuweit, Abdul Aziz swooped down upon Riyadh, surprised Ibn Rashid’s garrison, slew his representative and proclaimed his own accession from the recaptured city. The story of his bold adventure is part of the stock-in-trade of Bedouin reminiscence — the arrival of the tiny band at dusk in the palm-gardens south of the town, the halt till nightfall, the scaling of the palace wall by Abdul Aziz and eight picked followers, the flash of steel which roused and silenced the sleeping foe and, at dawn, the throwing open of the city gates to the comrades of the victor.

    The struggle was not over with the capture of Riyadh. In a contest, renewed year after year, Abdul Aziz recovered the territories of his fathers and made for himself a name which filled the echoing deserts. At length, in 1913, his restless energy brought him into fields of wider political importance. He seized the Turkish province of Hasa, formerly an appanage of Riyadh, ejected the Ottoman garrisons and established himself on the seaboard of the Persian Gulf. He was already on terms of personal friendship with Captain Shakespear, our Political Agent at Kuweit, and nothing was more certain than that his appearance on the coast must ultimately bring him into direct contact with Great Britain; but before the difficult question of his precise relationship to Constantinople had been adjusted, the outbreak of war with Turkey released us from all obligation to preserve a neutral attitude. In the winter of 1914 - 1915, Captain Shakespear made his way for the second time into Nejd and joined Ibn Saud, who was marching north to repel the attack of Ibn Rashid, engineered and backed by the Turks. The two forces met in Sedeir in an indecisive engagement in which Captain Shakespear, though he was present as a non-combatant, was wounded and killed. We lost in him a gallant officer whose knowledge of Central Arabia and rare skill in handling the tribesmen marked him out for a useful and distinguished career. His deeds have lived after him.

    Ibn Saud’s connection with us has received public confirmation in a durbar of Arab sheikhs held at Kuweit on November 20, where he was invested with the K.C.I.E. On that memorable occasion three powerful Arab chiefs, the Sheikh of Muhammerah, who, though a Persian subject, is of Arab stock, the Sheikh of Kuweit and Ibn Saud, Hakim of Nejd, stood side by side in amity and concord, and proclaimed their adherence to the British cause. In a speech as spontaneous as it was unexpected, Ibn Saud pointed out that, whereas the Ottoman Government had sought to dismember and weaken the Arab nation, British policy aimed at uniting and strengthening their leaders, and the Chief Political Officer, as he listened to words which will be repeated and discussed round every camp fire, must have looked back on years of patient work in the Gulf, and seen that they were good.

    Ibn Saud is now barely forty, though he looks some years older. He is a man of splendid physique, standing well over six feet, and carrying himself with the air of one accustomed to command. Though he is more massively built than the typical nomad sheikh, he has the characteristics of the well-bred Arab, the strongly marked aquiline profile, full-fleshed nostrils, prominent lips and long, narrow chin, accentuated by a pointed beard. His hands are fine, with slender fingers, a trait almost universal among the tribes of pure Arab blood, and, in spite of his great height and breadth of shoulder, he conveys the impression, common enough in the desert, of an indefinable lassitude, not individual but racial, the secular weariness of an ancient and self-contained people, which has made heavy drafts on its vital forces, and borrowed little from beyond its own Forbidding frontiers. His deliberate movements, his slow, sweet smile, and the contemplative glance of his heavy-lidded eyes, though they add to his dignity and charm, do not accord with the Western conception of a vigorous personality. Nevertheless, report credits him with powers of physical endurance rare even in hard-bitten Arabia. Among men bred in the camel-saddle, he is said to have few rivals as a tireless rider. As a leader of irregular forces he is of proved daring, and he combines with his qualities as a soldier that grasp of statecraft which is yet more highly prized by the tribesmen. To be ‘a statesman’ is, perhaps, their final word of commendation.

    Politician, ruler and raider, Ibn Saud illustrates a historic type. Such men as he are the exception in any community, but they are thrown up persistently by the Arab race in its own sphere, and in that sphere they meet its needs. They furnished the conquerors and military administrators of the Mohammedan invasion, who were successful just where Ibn Saud, if he had lived in a more primitive age, might have succeeded or failed (just as in a smaller field he may fail), in the task of creating out of a society essentially tribal, a united and homogeneous State of a durable nature. Mohammed el Rashid was the classic example in the generation before our own. He has been dead twenty years, but his fame survives. Like him, Abdul Aziz has drawn the loose mesh of tribal organization into a centralized administration and imposed on wandering confederacies an authority which, though fluctuating, is recognized as a political factor. The Saud have, in the palm-groves of Riyadh and oases of their northern and eastern provinces, Qasim and Hasa, wider resources, greater wealth and a larger settled population than the Rashid, and their dominion rests, therefore, on a more solid foundation; but the ultimate source of power, here, as in the whole course of Arab history, is the personality of the commander. Through him, whether he be an Abbasid Khalif or an Emir of Nejd, the political entity holds, and with his disappearance it breaks.

    If the salient feature of the Kuweit durbar was the recognition by the assembled Arab chiefs of the good will of Great Britain towards their race, it was the presence of an unchanging type of desert sovereignty, among conditions so modern that they had scarcely grown familiar to those who created them, which gave Ibn Saud’s visit to Basrah its distinctive colour. In the course of a few hours the latest machinery of offence was paraded before him. He watched the firing of high explosives at an improvised trench and the bursting of anti aircraft shells in the clear heaven above. He travelled by a railway not six months old and sped across the desert in a motor-car to the battle-field of Shaaibah, where he inspected British infantry and Indian cavalry, and witnessed a battery of artillery come into action. In one of the base hospitals, housed in a palace of our good friend the Sheikh of Muhammerah, he was shown the bones of his own hand under the Roentgen ray. He walked along the great wharfs on the Shatt el-Arab, through the heaped stores from which an army is clothed and fed, and saw an aeroplane climb up the empty sky. He looked at all these things with wonder, but the interest which he displayed in the mechanism of warfare was that of a man who seeks to learn, not of one who stands confused, and unconsciously he justified to the officers who were his hosts the reputation he has gained in Arabia for sound sense and distinguished bearing.

    ‘It is good for us’, said the Sheikh of Muhammerah, as the two chiefs took their leave, ‘to see your might.’ Those who heard him may well have found their thoughts reverting to a might greater and more constant than that of the War Lord, and looked forward to the day when we shall expound the science of peace instead of the science of destruction.

G. L. B.

Vehhabiler hakkinda Osmanli arşivi!

Doç. Dr. Zekeriya Kurşun/Tarih ve Medeniyet, Sayı 30

Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi’nde bulunan söz konusu rapor (BOA, DH-MUİ 17/4-22, Lef 5/1), 21 Aralık 1909′da, Medine’de Harem-i Nebevî müderrislerinden Abdurrahman b. İlyas tarafından kaleme alınarak Sadaret’e takdim edilmiştir. Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi’nde bölge ile ilgili, benzeri binlerce belge olmasına rağmen, bu belgenin önemi, eksikleri de olsa, adeta o coğrafyanın 19. yüzyıl tarihini özetlemesinden kaynaklanmaktadır.

Kutsal mekânlar yağmalanıyor

Basra Körfezi ve Orta Arabistan tarihinde önemli rol oynayan dış faktörlerin yanısıra, burada, oldukça güçlü ve bedevî Arap kabileleri üzerinde hayli etkili olan Suud, İbn-i Reşid, ve Kuveyt’teki el-Sabah aileleri ve özellikle bunlardan Suud ailesiyle özdeşleşmiş bulunan Vehhabîlik mezhebi de ayrı bir ağırlık taşımaktaydı.

İşte Abdurrahman b. İlyas, bu hususları dikkate alarak, raporunda önce İbn-i Suud ailesinin Vehhabîlik ile ilişkilerini dile getirmektedir:

“İbn Suud (Muhammed b. Suud), köklü bir Arap kabilesi olan Aneze urbanından olup, Benî Temîm diyarı denilen Necid kıtasında Dır’iyye namıyla bir köyün emîri idi ve yaygın bir nüfuza sahip değildi. Şeyh Muhammed b. Abdilvehhab, Mısır’da öğrenim gördükten sonra (genelde bu kanaat yanlıştır; onun, her ne kadar Mısır’a gitmiş ise de burada tahsil gördüğüne dair pek bilgi bulunmamaktadır) kendi adına ihdas ettiği mezhebi, Hicaz’da neşretmek [yaymak] istemiştir. Ancak, orada emeline ulaşamayınca, Necd içlerindeki Dır’iyye’ye giderek, buradaki ahalinin dinî konulardaki cehaletinden de istifadeyle, Vehhabî mezhebini neşretmeye muvaffak olmuştur. Bir süre sonra Emîr İbn Suud’a bu mezhebi kabul ettirmiştir. İttifakları akabinde bu ikili, çevredeki Bedevî kabileleri arasında da mezheblerini yaymağa başlamışlardır. 1785 senesinde Muhammed b. Abdilvehhab, İbn Suud ile birlikte, Vehhabîlik sayesinde Hicaz, Şam ve Irak havalisindeki bir hayli halkı idareleri altına almışlardır.”

İbn Suud – Muhammed b. Abdilvehhab işbirliğiyle bölgede gerçekleştirilen ve özellikle gerek Sünnî ve gerekse Şiî Müslümanların kıymet verdikleri, ancak Vehhabîler’in bunları şirk alâmeti saydıkları kutsal mekânların yağmalanması ve soyulmasından bahseden rapor şöyle devam etmektedir:

“O esnâda Necef ve Kerbelâ’ya tecavüz ile Vehhabîler, mübarek makamların kubbelerini yıkarak, buralarda mevcud olan kutsal emanetler ile kıymetli eşyaları gasb eylemişlerdir. Haremeyn’e (Mekke ve Medine’ye) tecavüz ederek, kısa bir muhasaradan sonra Mekke’yi ve Medine’yi zaptetmiş ve Hz. Peygamber’in kabrini yağma ve Ashâb-ı Kirâm hazretlerinin kabirlerini yerle bir etmişlerdir. Vehhabîler, Mekke ve Medine’yi istilâları sırasında, mahmel-i şerîfin ve hacıların da Hicaz’a girmesine engel olmuşlardır.”

İbn Suud’un, kendilerine uymayan Mekke ve Medine ahalisini “mezhebi muktezasınca şirk ile ittiham ederek tecdid-i imana davet ettiğini” kaydeden Harem-i Nebevî müderrisi Abdurrahman, daha sonra “Yapılan münazara ve görüşmelerden elde edilen bilgilere göre; Vehhabîler, bu mezhebe mensub olmayan diğer ehl-i İslâm’a müşrik nazarıyla bakmakta ve bunların mezheblerine girmeleri için zorlanmalarını kendilerine vacib görmektedirler. Ayrıca, davetlerine uymayanların katlinin de gerekliliğine inanmaktadırlar” demektedir.

Africa’s Oxford vandalized by Islamist militants

Situated in Mali, Timbuktu is a legendary city on the southern edge of the Saharan desert – desolate, forlorn, remote with some 333 Sufi saints buried there.
Whatever it may look like today with its dismal poverty, it used to be an important trade centre opening up across the Sahara, to the Mediterranean North African coast that had business links with Asia and Europe. For 600 years it continued to thrive and the city became the hub of West African trade. Along with trade, what attracted foreigners to visit the place, was its excellent Islamic university presided over by Sufi saints. Timbuktu disseminated knowledge and its scholars attracted disciples from across Europe and Asia. The most famous of its scholars is Cadi Sidi Mahmoud ben Amar (1463-1548) who was appointed Cadi (a judge) in 1498. His tomb is one of 16 most revered mausoleums in the city. These tombs were declared World Heritage sites by UNESCO.
In April 2012, northern Mali was overrun by the Islamist Ansar Dine who vowed to establish Sharia law in the area. Ansar Dine, an ultra-conservative fundamentalist group having links to Al-Queda, believes that tombs of Sufi saints are a form of idolatry and they took no time to impose their brand of Islam. On 30 June, a local journalist reported that the Ansar Dine activists, armed with pickaxes and shovels, had destroyed the tomb of Baba Amar and two other adjacent tombs. They vandalized a sacred door opening which, according to popular belief, would spell the end of the world. UNESCO made an appeal to spare the World Heritage Sites but the pickaxes would not rest until all the mausoleums were destroyed. Recently it was reported by media that 90 per cent of the sacred tombs have been destroyed by the Salafist Ansar Dine. Known as the Oxford of Africa, Timbuktu is in the process of losing its entire heritage along with hundreds and thousands of Arabic handwritten manuscripts which form a glorious chapter of its Islamic past.
Salafism (also known as Wahabism) is a brand of ultra-conservative Islam first propagated by Muhammad Ibn Abd-al Wahab of Najd, Saudi Arabia. Influenced by Imam ibn Taymiyya, he started preaching against impurities and innovations practiced by Muslims. Soon he fell out of favour with the local ruler and he was expelled from his birthplace Uyayna. He found a patron in the ruler of Diriya, Muhammad Ibn Saud who gave him shelter and entered into an agreement with him to the effect that while religious leadership would devolve on Muhammad Ibn Abd-al Wahab, temporal leadership would belong to the Saud family. So as a part of the purge-drive the Saudi rulers destroyed many historical and cultural sites in both Makkah and Madina. In the 1880s the Arab tribes in their zeal for reform nearly destroyed the holy shrine of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh). In 1920 the descendants of Ibn Saud bulldozed and levelled a graveyard – Jannatul Baqee in Madina which saw the destruction of shrines of Hazrat Fatema, Hazrat Hasan, Imam Zeinal Abedin, Imam Baqer, Imam Jafar Sadeque and some of the Prophet’s companions. Simultaneously, they destroyed parts of Jannatul Mualla in Makkah which included the holy shrines of Hazrat Khadija Al-Kobra, Hazrat Abdul Mottaleb and Abu Taleb. The seven mosques on the site of the Battle of Trench have been completely wiped out. Even they are contemplating to demolish the house where the Prophet (pbup) was born. It is estimated that 90 per cent of the 1000 year-old buildings in Makkah and Madina have been destroyed during the last two decades. Tarek Fatah, a Pakistani Canadian writes in Toronto Star, “What makes this demolition worse is the fact that the home of the Prophet (pubh) is to make way for a parking lot, two 50-storey hotel towers and seven 35-storey apartment blocks; a project known as the Jabal Omar Scheme, all within a stone’s throw of the Grand Mosque”.
So the Salafists, aided by petrodollars, are all over Africa, Asia and Europe. The Taliban who destroyed the 6th century Statue of Buddha share their fanaticism with the Salafists and are keen on imposing Sharia Law. It was the Taliban who destroyed the Lahore Mausoleum of Data Ganj Baksh in 2010 which left 42 people killed and many others injured. Petrodollar is also active in India, Bangladesh and Indonesia in the form of grants and aid for mosques and Madrasas where the Wahabi-Salafi brand of Islam is practiced.
The reckless demolition of Timbuktu Sufi tombs is a part of the global agenda of the countries that provide funds for Ansar Dine, Al Shabab, Boko Haram who are better armed than the African states within which they operate. It is ironical that one Babri Mosque generates so much heat within and outside India, but the destruction of the Holy Prophet’s (pubh) residence does not provoke any response from the Muslim states around the globe! No wonder that the destruction of Timbuktu heritage has gone almost unnoticed by the Islamic world!

The writer, a professor of English at IIUC, Dhaka Campus, is Associate Editor of The Independent. He is also the former DG and President of Bangla Academy and can be reached at: mharunursra@yahoo.com

The American Muslim (TAM)

Destruction of Islamic Architectural Heritage in Saudi Arabia: A Wake-up Call

By Saeed Shehabi

In year 2002, Dr Ahmad Zaki Yamani, the former Oil Minister of Saudi Arabia, delivered a lecture at the School of Oriental and African Studies in London, on a subject that had not been openly discussed at this level. Dr Yamani’s lecture was about a project that he had undertaken to excavate the site of the Holy Prophet’s house in Makkah. A team of more than 300 workers, engineers, archaeologists and other experts worked over a 24-hour period, excavated the house, took detailed images of its design and structure, and filled it with sand before they left. When Dr Yamani was asked why the house was hidden again, he said that there were powerful people in his country who would object to the whole operation, arguing that it was blasphemous to glorify anyone but God. During the discussion, a young Jordanian man stood up and said: “Isn’t it a waste of money and effort to do what you had done in order to unearth old stones that would benefit no one?”

Dr Yamani replied: “Thank you. You have made my task easier. Ladies and Gentlemen, this is the mentality we are facing in Saudi Arabia. I hope you now understand why we had to cover the findings in haste.”

During this year, 2006, the extent of the destruction of historic Islamic monuments has come to light with devastating impact. It is now estimated that more than 90 per cent of historic mosques, mausoleums and other artefacts have been erased from the face of the earth, to the extent that some Saudi voices, especially from the Hejaz, have begun to question the wisdom of the eradication of the country’s historic wealth. The policy of destruction and enmity to anything that is of symbolic value has now crossed the borders of Saudi Arabia to other countries. The destruction in February 2006 of the ninth-century tomb of Samarra in Iraq has extended the boundaries of this policy to other parts of the Arab and Muslim world. There is now a growing fear that other monuments and mausoleums in Iraq and elsewhere may be targeted by elements loyal to the Salafi School of Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al Wahabi, the godfather of the most destructive force in the Muslim world. In May 2001, the 2000-ye ar-old statue of Buddha in the Afghan city of Bamyan was demolished by the Taliban forces, which ruled Afghanistan for five years (1996–2001). Although several delegations from Muslim countries flew to Kabul to dissuade the Taliban leader, Mullah Omar, from destroying the monument, they failed in their mission.The extremism of today’s Salafi movement has become a force of annihilation, which spares no one in its drive to dominate the Muslim world. It is closely linked to the Wahhabi movement founded by Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al Wahab (1703–1792 AC). His aim was to purify Islam by returning all Muslims to what he believed were its original principles as typified by al Salaf al Şalihīn (the earliest converts to Islam). He rejected what he regarded as corruption introduced by bid‘a (innovation, reformation) and shirk (idolatry). During his lifetime, he denounced the practices of various sects of Sufism as heretical and unorthodox, such as their veneration of saints. Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al Wahab revived interest in the works of an earlier scholar, Ibn Taymiyyah (661–728AH/1263–1328AC), and his disciple, Ibn al Jawziyyah (d. 1350 AC).

Ibn Taymiyyah was reported to have said: “The leaders of Islam agreed that it is not permitted to build the mausoleums over the graves. They cannot be considered mosques and praying in them is not permitted.” 

Later, Ibn Jawziyyah said: “The mausoleums that are built on graves must be demolished. It is not permitted to keep them for one day if there is the power to demolish them.” Seven centuries had passed after the advent of Islam with none of the scholars raising the issue. Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al Wahab, who came four centuries after Ibn Jawziyyah, went further in his extremism and adopted doctrines that label people with differing views as unbelievers and polytheists. Those falling into these categories, according to him, were worthy of nothing but extermination. Their lives deserved no sanctity, their wealth could be plundered and their families could be enslaved or killed. The legacy of Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al Wahab has not only survived for two centuries, but has also acquired new international dimensions. Extremists are now distributed over the five continents and are threatening not only non-Muslims but also the very fabric of the Muslim Ummah, which is being destroyed in the rising sectarian discord promoted by followers of the neo-Salafis.

Within Saudi Arabia itself, fear has become a major factor in silencing the voices of dissent. Despite the atrocities of recent years, which are committed by the neo-Wahhabis and neo-Salafis against non-Muslims as well as Muslims, the Saudi government has refused to disengage from its historic pact with the Wahhabis. Apart from the ideological and political consequences of this pact, the country’s heritage has been subjected to utter vandalism and eradication. Although some brave writers and commentators have questioned the wisdom of this destruction, their pleas are ignored. It is a religious or political war? What is the role of politicians in encouraging this policy? Is it an interest-based war or the result or ignorance and prejudice?Earlier this year (2006), the grave of Hashim ibn ‘Abd Manaf, Prophet Muhammad’s grandfather, in the Palestinian city of Gaza was desecrated. Mr ‘Abd al Latif Hashim, the Director of the Documentation Department at the Palestinian Ministry of Endowments, accused the Salafis and Wahhabis of carrying out this heinous act, and described the destruction of the grave as the loss of a historic monument in Palestine.

The desecration was in line with the pattern of destruction followed by the Wahhabis over the past two centuries. Muslims consider these acts a disaster for the Muslim world for several reasons. First, they are an attack on civilization and culture and the losses are irreplaceable. Second, targeting symbols that are sacred to others can only provoke sectarian and religious tension, which could lead to bloodshed. Third, it compromises the principle of tolerance that

Islam promotes among people to safeguard social and religious peace. Fourth, targeting the graves and tomb s of historic Muslim figures is tantamount to humiliating these noble ancestors and is contradictory to Islamic values and teachings.

Historically, the destruction of graves goes back to the early days of Islam, although at that time, it was carried out for different reasons. In 236 AH/850 AC, the Abbasid Caliph, al Mutawakkil, ordered the destruction of Imam Hussain’s grave. The earth was levelled and the ground flooded with water. It was a political revenge for the rebellion against the Abbasid rule, spearheaded by followers of the descendants of the Holy Prophet. It was an act to prevent the use of this holy site becoming a centre for the opposition to the Abbasids. Attacks on graves on the early days of Islam were motivated by politics rather than religion. However, during the past two centuries, enmity against religious symbolism has been presented with the support of religious edicts in line with the teachings of Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al Wahab.

Visiting tombs of disciples or faith symbols has been equated to polytheism (shirk), which is liable to the maximum punishment. Tension with other schools of juris prudence has escalated and a state of religious polarization has been forming in the Muslim world. The present Saudi rule in the early twentieth century is a marriage of convenience between the Salafi trend based on Wahhabi traditions and the Saudi ambitious political agenda. Relations among Muslims have become strained as the Salafi movement has taken root in many places, thanks to the Saudi petrodollars that have been abundant since the mid-1970s as a result of the oil boom. Two hundred years ago, the Saudi–Wahhabi alliance wreaked havoc in Iraq. When its forces invaded the country in 1816, they destroyed the mausoleum of Imam Hussain and other sacred places before they left.

The Arabian Peninsula became the launching pad for the new politico-religious trend. This led to the destruction of more than 90 per cent of Islamic monuments, holy places, tombs and mausoleums. Anything that had symbolic significance unrelated to the Wahhabi school of thought was deemed “polytheistic” and faced destruction. In 1924, ‘Abd al ‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud and his troops occupied Makkah in the region of Hejaz. Among their first actions was the destruction of al Mu’alla graveyard, which contained the grave of Khadijah, Prophet Muhammad’s wife, and that of his uncle, Abu Talib. Two years later, in 1926, Ibn Sa‘ud occupied Madinah and demolished the tombed mausoleum over the graves of several of Prophet Muhammad’s descendants, including those of his daughter, Fatimah, and his grandson, Hassan ibn ‘Ali. Since no tangible resistance to their heinous actions was mounted by Muslims, they went even further and demolished the famous Seven Mosques of Salman al Farisi, Abu Bakr, ‘Umar,  Fatimah, ‘Ali, al Qiblatayn and al Fath. Their sites have been transformed into banking facilities such cash dispensing machines.The pain of the people of the Hejaz has become so intense that their journalists have begun to raise their voices. On 10 September 2004, Muhammad al Dubaisi wrote in the newspaper, al Madinah, an article entitled “The destruction of these mosques has deprived Madinah of one pillar of its immortal history, and a minaret of its traditional glory”. Saleh al Fawzan, a Salafi writer, contributed an article in response a week later to the same newspaper, justifying the destruction of the historic mosques.The Wahhabis have gone even further. They have demolished the grave and tomb of Hamza ibn ‘Abd al Mutallib, Prophet Muhammad’s uncle. They have cleared the graveyard of the martyrs of Uhud (the second battle of Prophet Muhammad after the Conquest of Madinah). The routes of the battles of Badr and Uhud (first and second battles of Prophet Muhammad) have also been cleared. Serious consideration is now being given to the idea that the Cave of Hirā’ (where Prophet Muhammad received God’s Message from the Angel Gabriel) should be destroyed. This is not a building, but a cave in the mountain. Four years ago, heavy demolition equipment, including excavators, were dispatched to desecrate the mausoleum of Sayyid ‘Ali al Araidhi (d. 825 AC). On 12 August 2002, the grave of this respected figure (the son of Imam Jaffar al Sadiq) was removed from the face of the earth. An order is now in place to desecrate the grave of one of Prophet Muhammad’s Companions, Rafa‘ah ibn Rafi‘al Zurqi.  He took part in the battles of Badr, Uhud and al Khandaq. He also participated in the Bay‘at al Ridwan. An adjacent historic mosque known as al Khandiq is due for destruction. Another symbolic site has recently been desecrated. The birthplace of Prophet Muhammad has been removed and new toilets built on the sire. There is also a plan to separate Prophet Muhammad’s grave from his mosque in preparation for the desecration of the grave itself. The connecting doors between the two sites are regularly closed as a prelude to the implementation of the plan. It is known, too, that the Ka‘bah has not been spared the heinous actions of the Wahhabis.

Early in 2006, many of the artefacts and historic items inside it have been removed and destroyed, including engraved writings, silk ornaments and curtains.

On 25 August 2005, the web site of al ‘Arabiyyah (the leading Saudi satellite channel) published an important article with the title, “A new plan for Madinah angers archaeologists…. Historians and intellectuals call for a review of the destruction of artefacts in Makkah and Madinah”. The article argued that these artefacts cannot lead to religious inventions and must not be destroyed. It quoted Dr Anwar Ishqi, a renowned thinker, as refuting the arguments that these historic items can create religious confusion and it called for the protection of the mere 10 per cent that have so far been spared destruction. Another thinker, Dr Sami Anqawi, a senior researcher in the artefacts of Makkah and Madinah and a former Director of Pilgrimage Research, called for a comprehensive view of the Muslim scholars, and confirmed that only a small percentage of historic works remain and that the continued destruction will bury Islamic history and civilization. On the same day, the Saudi daily newspaper, al Watan, confirmed that a new plan for Madinah would certainly destroy one of the most important historic quarters of the city. The area of Shraibat would be annihilated in the following months, together with all the sites relating to early Islamic and Prophetic history.

Extremist trends have mushroomed from the Wahhabi–Salafi movement and have become a threat to the political and social fabric of Muslim countries, in addition to world peace and security. Muslim scholars and thinkers are thus urged to deal effectively with this destructive ideology before it achieves the total eradication of the Islamic heritage, not only in the Arabian Peninsula but also elsewhere. The destruction of several historic sites in Iraq, including that of the Askari Mausoleum in Samarra, is a wake-up call to everyone. It must be heeded without any further delay.

Originally published on Islam21 an International Forum for Islamic Dialogue (IFID) publication.  Saeed Shehabi, Ph.D. is Chairman of IFID, London, England.

see also:

Saudi Destruction of Muslim Historical Sites, Sheila Musaji
The Destruction of Holy Sites in Mecca and Medina, Dr. Irfan Ahmed
Saudi’s build public toilets over The House of Sayyida Khadija
Saudi Royals Destroying Home of Muhammad, Tarek Fatah
Muslim hush over Saudi destruction of prophet (p) home shocking, By: Nabil Raza
Destruction of historic Mecca under Saudi Trusteeship, by Mirza A. Beg

 

Shame of the House of Saud: Shadows over Mecca

There is a growing shadow being cast over Islam's holiest site. Only a few metres from the walls of the Grand Mosque in Mecca skyscrapers are reaching further into the sky, slowly blocking out the light. These enormous and garish newcomers now dwarf the elegant black granite of the Kaaba, the focal point of the four million Muslims' annual Haj pilgrimage.

The tower blocks are the latest and largest evidence of the destruction of Islamic heritage that has wiped almost all of the historic city from the physical landscape. As revealed in The Independent last August,the historic cities of Mecca and Medina are under an unprecedented assault from religious zealots and their commercial backers.

Writing in response to the article, Prince Turki al-Faisal said that Saudi Arabia was spending more than $19bn (£11bn) preserving and maintaining these two holy sites. "[We are aware] how important the preservation of this heritage is, not just to us but to the millions of Muslims from around the world who visit the two holy mosques every year. It is hardly something we are going to allow to be destroyed."

This rebuttal sits at odds with a series of previously unseen photographs, published today, that document the demolition of key archaeological sites and their replacement with skyscrapers.

Saudi religious authorities have overseen a decades-long demolition campaign that has cleared the way for developers to embark on a building spree of multi-storey hotels, restaurants, shopping centres and luxury apartment blocks on a scale unseen outside Dubai. The driving force behind this historical demolition is Wahhabism ­ the austere state faith that the House of Saud brought with it when Ibn Saud conquered the Arabian peninsula in the 1920s.

The Wahhabis live in fanatical fear that places of historical or religious interest could give rise to alternative forms of pilgrimage or worship. Their obsession with combating idolatry has seen them flatten all evidence of a past that does not agree with their interpretation of Islam.

Irfan Ahmed al-Alawi, the chairman of the Islamic Heritage Foundation, set up to help protect the holy sites, says the case of the grave of Amina bint Wahb, the mother of the Prophet, found in 1998, is typical of what has happened. "It was bulldozed in Abwa and gasoline was poured on it. Even though thousands of petitions throughout the Muslim world were sent, nothing could stop this action."

Today there are fewer than 20 structures remaining in Mecca that date back to the time of the Prophet 1,400 years ago. The litany of this lost history includes the house of Khadijah, the wife of the Prophet, demolished to make way for public lavatories; the house of Abu Bakr, the Prophet's companion, now the site of the local Hilton hotel; the house of Ali-Oraid, the grandson of the Prophet, and the Mosque of abu-Qubais, now the location of the King's palace in Mecca.

Yet the same oil-rich dynasty that pumped money into the Taliban regime as they blew up the Bamiyan Buddhas in Afghanistan six years ago has so far avoided international criticism for similar acts of vandalism at home. Mai Yamani, author of The Cradle of Islam, said it was time for other Muslim governments to ignore the al-Sauds' oil wealth and clout and speak out. "What is alarming about this is that the world doesn't question the al-Sauds' custodianship of Islam's two holy places. These are the sites that are of such importance to over one billion Muslims and yet their destruction is being ignored," she said. "When the Prophet was insulted by Danish cartoonists thousands of people went into the streets to protest. The sites related to the Prophet are part of their heritage and religion but we see no concern from Muslims."

Lay people, and in some cases even US senators could be forgiven for thinking that the House of Saud has been the guardian of the two holy places for time immemorial. In fact, it is only 80 years since the tribal chieftain Ibn Saud occupied Mecca and Medina. The House of Saud has been bound to Wahhabism since the 18th century religious reformer Mohamed Ibn Abdul-Wahab signed a pact with Mohammed bin Saud in 1744. Wahab's warrior zealots helped to conquer a kingdom for the tribal chieftains. The House of Saud got its wealth and power, and the clerics got the vehicle of state they needed to spread their fundamentalist ideology around the world. The ruler of this fledgling kingdom needed the legitimacy afforded by declaring himself " custodian of the two holy places".

But that legitimacy has come at an enormous price for the diversity of Muslims who look to Mecca for guidance. Once in charge, the Wahhabists wasted little time in censoring the Haj. As early as 1929, Egyptian pilgrims were refused permission to celebrate the colourful Mahmal rites and more than 30 were killed. At the time Egypt severed diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia. Few governments have stood up to them since.

Instead, the homogenisation of Islam's holiest sites was allowed to accelerate into a demolition campaign that now threatens the birthplace of the Prophet itself. The site survived the early reign of Ibn Saud 50 years ago when the architect for the planned library persuaded the absolute ruler to allow him to preserve the remains under the new structure. Saudi authorities now plan to "update" the site with a car park that would mean concreting over the remains.

"The al-Sauds need to rein in the Wahhabists now," warns Dr Yamani. "Mecca used to be a symbol of Muslim diversity and it needs to be again." But with oil prices and profits, at record highs, there is little sign the House of Saud is listening.

Sami Angawi, a Hijazi architect who has devoted his life to a largely doomed effort to preserve what remains of the history of the world's greatest pilgrimage sites, said that the final farewell to Mecca was imminent. " What we are witnessing are the last days of Mecca and Medina."

Mecca's skyline

Giant cranes and half-constructed skyscrapers tower over the Grand Mosque in Mecca. Six new property developments, including the Bin Laden group's Zam Zam Tower, are transforming the character of Islam's holiest city

ISLAMIC HERITAGE FOUNDATION

Mountain of light

The mountain of light, or al-Nour, is next in the Wahhabis' sights. Home to the Hira'a cave, it was here that the Prophet is said to have received the first verses of the Koran. Hardline clerics want it destroyed to stop pilgrims visiting. At the foot of the hill there is a Wahhabi fatwa: " The Prophet Mohamed (PBUH) did not permit us to climb on to this hill, not to pray here, not to touch stones, and tie knots on trees..."

ISLAMIC HERITAGE FOUNDATION

The Prophet's wife's grave

The ruins in the foreground are the remains of the grave of the Prophet's wife, Al Baqi, destroyed in the 1950s. The mutawi religious police are present night and day to prevent anyone placing flowers on the site, or even praying in the proximity of the graves

THE ISLAMIC HERITAGE FOUNDATION

Al Oraid Mosque

The 1,200-year-old mosque, site of the grave of the Prophet's grandson al-Oraid, is seen here being dynamited. Gathered around the site are Saudi religious police with their distinctive red scarves, who appear to be celebrating

THE ISLAMIC HERITAGE FOUNDATION