What Google Isn't Telling Us About The Video It's Banned In 5 Countries (And Counting) - The Huffington Post

Censoring a video that doesn't break local laws or violate YouTube's terms of use marks an extraordinary, highly unusual move on Google's part that underscores the responsibility tech companies are now shouldering, by virtue of their outsized reach, to arbitrate free speech, shape international affairs and export values from their home nations.

Who decided to pull the video and why? What sort of conversations did Google have with government officials about the film? (And let's not take "none" for an answer.)

Why isn't this censorship, in places where the video is legal?

Has violence subsided in places where YouTube pulled the film? Will it? And will the "temporarily restricted" video be re-posted in places where it's legal as soon as the violence subsides?

Does banning the video reward violence? Is this a lesson that controversial content can be snuffed out if enough people are injured, enough buildings are burned and government officials ask nicely enough?

Would the video have been removed if it was an article?

Would the video have been removed if it had sparked violence by pro-democracy protesters?

Let's imagine a YouTube video of police abusing a political protester spreads in Russia, where it sets off a wave of violent, anti-government protests by pro-democracy groups. Does that video stay, or does it go? When does Google listen to violence, and when does it ignore it? Is all violence created equal?

Would the video have been removed if the violence had been in the United States?

Say a YouTube clip about the Jewish faith -- one that's not hate speech according to YouTube's definition, or technically illegal -- sets off a wave of attacks against synagogues in the United States. Would it be blocked? If not, what does that tell us about the way Google views other parts of the world?

Does Google get to decide when other countries are "ready" for free speech?

And given another chance, would Google have acted the same way? Will it?

Google's response to these events has been ad hoc at best and dangerously haphazard at worst.

Even those who agree with YouTube's decision to pull the video argue that Google has fallen short.

But there's more to be said about this difficult decision made under difficult circumstances. Will Google say it?

The company, which now has unprecedented power to influence the course of world events, from snuffing out pro-democracy movements to shaping elections, needs to answer these questions. With so much power, we need more transparency from a company that is a window to the world.

The Ottoman empire's secular history undermines sharia claims | Tehmina Kazi | Comment is free | guardian.co.uk

Hardline Muslim groups often portray the Ottoman empire as a magic template for a global caliphate. This is then used as a springboard for grandiose arguments that paint a caliphate as viable, and deem it as the only credible model of governance for the future. These arguments are based on a belief that the empire adhered to a single interpretation of sharia (Islamic law) for over 600 years, and – crucially – that its success was contingent on this.

But a paper by Ishtiaq Hussain, published by Faith Matters on Saturday displays a very different picture. Ottoman sultans, or caliphs, in the 18th and 19th centuries launched secular schools and promoted the education of women. The period of reformation known as the Tanzimat saw customary and religious laws being replaced in favour of secular European ones. More surprisingly, homosexuality was decriminalised in 1858 (long before many western states took their cue, and over a century before the American Psychiatric Association declassified it as a mental illness in 1973). Contrary to the claims of hardline groups, religious authorities approved many of these measures.

In terms of broader social change, the Ottomans made strong attempts to integrate non-Muslim communities. On the cultural front, it is well known that a minority of people claim that Islam frowns upon artistic expression. However, the last sultan/caliph, Abdulmecid Efendi (1922-1924) has numerous paintings on display in Istanbul's new museum of modern art; many others were also keen musicians and played a variety of musical instruments. It is therefore clear that the sultan/caliphs enunciated a progressive vision for a secular Muslim society, many years before al-Qaida and similar groups came into existence.

For those who dismiss President Ataturk's vision as an anomaly, this reconsideration of their history must come as a nasty shock.

The purpose of Hussain's paper is to encourage people who carry the baton for totalitarian ideologies – including those who are inspired by Anwar al-Awlaki – to think again. The recent deaths of al-Awlaki and his demagogue Osama bin Laden only mean that part of the battle is won.

The other part of the battle is ideological, and this paper boldly leads the way by challenging a key component of that ideology. It does a stellar job in exposing the fallacies that lie within extremist narratives. For example, why do some groups refer to the Ottoman empire as a "caliphate" when it did not synchronise state law with religious law?

When hardline groups present Islam as a rigid political ideology, they end up doing a great disservice to Islam and Muslim communities. One of Islam's strengths is its relevance to all places and all times, which means that it can take on numerous expressions according to local circumstances. Scholars like Emory University professor Abdullahi An-Na'im recognise that the content of the sharia is bound to its historical context.

An-Naim maintains that concepts such as human rights and citizenship are more consistent with Islamic principles than a state which purports to be Islamic and enforces sharia. In his book, Islam and the Secular State, he goes as far as to suggest that the very idea of an Islamic state is based on European ideas of state and law, and not the Islamic tradition.

It is now more important than ever for greater numbers of individuals to stand up against fascism and extremism – no matter where it comes from. This is why groups like British Muslims for Secular Democracy (BMSD) – the organisation that I work for – have protested against both al-Muhajiroun (in their various guises) and Stop the Islamification of Europe.

Of course, we support the findings of this paper, and hope this is disseminated as widely as possible. I also hope this paper will get far-right groups to reconsider the history of Muslims in Europe, and make them realise the positive contribution Islam has made in countries like Turkey and Spain.

The importance of grassroots work to this end – in schools, universities, refugee centres and on social networking sites – cannot be underestimated. Finally, I would like to see the government develop a sound understanding of the issues in this paper, and their relevance to the British Muslim situation. This would be a fitting token of support for organisations like BMSD and Faith Matters.